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INTRODUCTION 
Although manifestations of discrimination in the workplace have 
changed greatly over time, employment discrimination continues to be 
a tremendous problem in society. 1 By enacting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), Congress shielded employees from 
arbitrary adverse employment actions arising from discrimination 
related to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 Three years 
1. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Op­
portunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 599-613 (2000) (citing numerous statistical and anecdotal 
studies that investigate and identify aggregate and individual discrimination in the modern 
workplace, and concluding that although "discrimination today is more subtle and difficult 
to identify" it is still a pervasive problem). 
2. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion. sex, or national origin; 
or 
1338 
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later, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA''), 3 guaranteeing the same protections against discrimination 
based on age.4 Finally, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 5 
passed in 1990, prohibited discrimination based on personal disability. 
Ten years after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court developed a comprehensive framework for presenting 
and analyzing these cases.6 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 the 
Court outlined a three-part sequence for handling individual disparate 
treatment claims. First, the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of 
discrimination.8 Next, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment 
action. 9 Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the 
employer's allegedly nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for 
discrimination.10 
In addition to creating this burden-shifting procedure, the 
McDonnell Douglas decision is also widely cited for identifying four 
factors that a plaintiff may use to establish a prima facie case.11 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). 
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). 
4. The protected group of the ADEA is defined as people over the age of forty. 29 
U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000); see also David G. Harris, Employment Law: O'Connor v. Consoli­
dated Coin Caterers Corp. - Eliminating the Replacement Outside the Protected Class 
Element in ADEA Hiring and Replacement Cases, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1997) (noting 
that, other than "age" replacing "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," the text of 
Title VII and the ADEA is identical). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
6. Disparate treatment claims, which occur when an employer intentionally discrimi­
nates against an employee because of his protected characteristic, are distinct from disparate 
impact claims, which center around a facially neutral policy that nonetheless disproportion­
ately affects workers in a protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), and its progeny apply to disparate treatment cases, the only type of discrimination 
this Note addresses. See generally Harris, supra note 4, at 285-86 (defining disparate impact 
and disparate treatment). 
7. 411 U.S. at 792. 
8. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (concluding that the complainant in a Title Vil 
trial carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 804. 
11. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff had to prove: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was re­
jected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con­
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id. at 802. These fac­
tors were directly tailored to fit this particular plaintiffs situation. Mr. Green was a black 
employee bringing a failure to rehire claim against his employer. 
1340 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1338 
Despite the particularity of this list, the Court was clear that because 
facts vary in Title VII cases, the specific proofs needed to sustain a 
prima facie case would vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.12 
Since McDonnell Douglas, the Court has only paused once to 
consider what exactly a plaintiff must prove to establish his prima facie 
case of discrimination. In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers 
Corp.,13 the Court held that an ADEA plaintiff is not compelled to 
show replacement at work by someone outside his protected class in 
order to maintain a prima facie case of discrimination.14 
While the O'Connor decision assumed that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework applied to the ADEA,15 the Court in O'Connor 
made no mention of whether this particular ADEA decision applies to 
other discrimination claims. 16 Thus, the Supreme Court has remained 
vague in its Title VII jurisprudence regarding exactly what types of 
evidence a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish a prima facie case. 
By not confronting the issue of Title VII prima facie requirements 
directly, the Supreme Court created a void in the body of Title VII 
jurisprudence regarding what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination.17 
Lower courts are inconsistent in deciding whether an employee 
must show that her job replacement is someone outside her protected 
class to sustain her prima facie burden under Title VII.18 Several 
Id. at 793-96. It is also important to note that the Court uses the word "may" rather than 
"must" in delineating these factors. See id. at 802; see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc., 239 f.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that although the may/must distinction is 
usually of no consequence, it should be drawn nonetheless in light of those few situations 
where it would be relevant). 
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (holding that "the specification above of 
the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect 
to differing factual situations"). 
13. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). 
14. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312 ("Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an 
ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element 
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case."). 
15. Id. at 311 (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework is transferable from 
Title VII to the ADEA because the parties did not contest the point). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
17. Although this Note primarily discusses the impact of a non-class replacement 
requirement on Title VII plaintiffs, the analysis is equally applicable to ADA plaintiffs 
alleging simple disparate treatment discrimination. 
18. The language "protected class" and "non-protected class" is somewhat misleading in 
Title VII cases. Unlike the ADEA and the ADA, both of which protect specific groups of 
people, Title VII simply prohibits discrimination based on several protected characteristics. 
Because "protected class" is used throughout the jurisprudence and scholarship, this Note 
will adhere to that language. See, e.g., Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 485 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (questioning whether a Title VII plaintiff alleging gender discrimination must 
show that "she was replaced by a member of a non-protected class"); Chuang v. Univ. of 
Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (characterizing one of the prima facie 
requirements for a Title VII plaintiff under McDonnell Douglas as an identification that 
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courts require a plaintiff to prove as part of her initial burden that her 
work replacement is someone not in her protected class.19 Other courts 
explicitly reject a non-class replacement requirement, only to impose 
other formulaic tests and comparative evidence requirements that 
continue to limit plaintiffs' claims.2 0 At the opposite end of the 
continuum, some courts take more flexible approaches to the plain­
tiff's prima facie requirements. Under these approaches, while non-
"similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably"). 
However, it should be noted that in referring to claims brought under Title VII throughout 
this Note, the term "non-class replacement requirement" more precisely means a require­
ment that someone with a different variation of a particular protected characteristic replaced 
the plaintiff. 
19. This approach is accepted by the 4th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits. See, e. g:, Bass v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs., 256 F.3d 1095, 1104 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff must show 
"other equally or less qualified employees who are not members of his race were hired"); 
Brown v. McLean, 150 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Title VII plaintiff must 
"ordinarily show that the position was filled by someone not of a protected class"); Klein v. 
Derwinksi, 869 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff must show he has been 
"replaced by a person not in the protected class, or such a person with comparable qualifica­
tions and work records was not terminated"). But see, e.g., Willingham v. Abraham, No. 00-
5125, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7533, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2001) (noting, but not resolving, 
that O'Connor may cast doubt on current phrasing of a requirement to include a non-class 
replacement); Larebo v. Clemson Univ., No. 98-2234, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4824, at *11 
(4th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999) (interpreting the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement simply as 
an "adverse employment action occurr[ing] under circumstances that raise an inference of 
discrimination"); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting a per se rule requiring non-class replacement because that fact is not the only way 
to create an inference of discrimination). 
20. These restrictions include a requirement that the plaintiff must show that "the job 
was not eliminated after his discharge." Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 
1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000). But see EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 
1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring only that plaintiffs show that the adverse employment action 
occurred under "circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination" 
(quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))). Another pos­
sibility is a comparative requirement under which plaintiffs must show other similarly situ­
ated individuals outside their protected class were treated more favorably than they were 
treated. See, e.g., Shah v. Gen. Elec. Co., 816 F.2d 264, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
comparative evidence showing that non-protected employees were treated more favorably is 
"indispensable" to a plaintiff's prima facie case). The Sixth Circuit uses this comparative re­
quirement both as an alternative to non-class replacement, and occasionally as an additional 
requirement. Compare Walker v. Montcalm Ctr. for Behavioral Health, No. 00-1470, 2000 
U.S. App. LEXIS 31046, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding that a plaintiff must show 
either non-class replacement or that other similarly situated non-protected employees were 
treated more favorably), with Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 
(6th Cir. 1996) (creating a five-pronged test in which a plaintiff must show both non-class 
replacement and that similarly situated individuals outside her protected group were treated 
more favorably). Finally, some circuits employ any variety of multipronged tests. For exam­
ple, after explicitly rejecting a non-class replacement requirement, the First Circuit replaced 
it with a prima facie test requiring proof of the McDonnell Douglas factors. See Cumpiano v. 
Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Today we set any uncertainty to . 
rest and rule that in a case where an employee claims to have been discharged in violation of 
Title VII, she can make out the fourth element of her prima facie case without proving that 
her job was filled by a person not possessing her protected attribute."); Fernandes v. Costa 
Bros. Masonry Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 584 (1st Cir. 1999) (listing McDonnell Douglas factors as 
the required prima facie test). 
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class replacement "may help to raise an inference of discrimination . .. 
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. " 2 1 Yet even those 
courts that regularly adopt flexible approaches to the prima facie stage 
are inconsistent in articulating, applying, or enforcing the standard.22 
A court might articulate non-class replacement as a requirement, but 
then simply consider non-class replacement as a factor.23 Conversely, a 
court will sometimes use a more strict formulation than that which it 
normally requires because the plaintiff is able to satisfy the more 
stringent test, but then deliberately state that the court is expressing 
21. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 
Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (declaring there is 
no "unbending rule" about what circumstances may be used to raise an inference of dis­
crimination"). Rather than requiring plaintiffs to fit their prima facie evidence "into a set of 
pigeonholes," id., this approach is a flexible inquiry by which a plaintiff must simply "estab­
lish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination." Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 
F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Simmons v. New Pub. Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 
1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 2001) (requiring only that the plaintiff prove that "there exists evidence 
that gives rise to an inference of discrimination"); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 
243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring the plaintiff simply to show facts that give rise to 
an inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage); Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 
F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that so long as the plaintiff was able to introduce other facts 
raising an inference of discrimination, she did not have to prove she was replaced by some­
one outside her protected class). 
22. For example, in a four year time span, one circuit described the fourth prong of the 
prima facie test as requiring everything from a demonstration that "similarly situated indi­
viduals outside the protected class were treated more favorably," to a mere showing of re­
placement by an employee outside the protected class requirement, to a strict non-class re· 
placement formulation. See Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123; Payne v. Norwest Corp., 185 F.3d 
1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (consolidating state and federal discrimination claims and requir· 
ing the plaintiff to show that he was replaced by a woman to satisfy the prima facie stage of 
his sex discrimination claim); Moller v. State Pers. Bd., No. 95-16620, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
34005, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996) (requiring that the plaintiff show that his employer 
sought a replacement employee with similar qualifications); see also, e. g., Roach v. Vallen 
Safety Supply, No. 00-2709, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 6200, at *2-3 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 2001) 
(treating non-class replacement as a requirement that can be waived with other circum­
stances raising an inference of discrimination); Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 
450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) (listing non-class replacement as a requirement, but then qualifying 
that an employee can show another logical reason for discrimination to satisfy the prima fa­
cie standard); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 357 (holding that a jury instruction that erroneously in­
cluded a non-class replacement requirement was not reversible error); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 
114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring the plaintiff to show that someone not in his 
protected class filled the position to sustain a prima facie case). Compare Okoye v. Univ. of 
Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (claiming that the plaintiff is 
required to "prove that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class"), and 
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plain­
tiff must show "that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected group), with Nieto 
v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting an earlier circuit precedent 
which precluded plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case if they could not show non­
class replacement), and Trader Publ'g Co. , 218 F.3d at 485 (declaring that the plaintiffs 
inability to demonstrate non-class replacement does not "necessarily mean that she failed to 
establish her prima facie case"). 
23. Elizabeth Clack-Freeman, Title Vil and Plaintiffs Replacement: A Prima Facie Con· 
sideration?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 463, 487 nn.171 & 174 (1998) (collecting cases including, for 
example, Nieto, 108 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1997), and Johnson v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 94-5972, 
1995 WL 704264, at "7 n.3 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1995)). 
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"no opinion on whether" that is the"'proper articulation." 2 4 Even 
appellate courts that regularly denounce a non-class replacement 
requirement will often hold as harmless errors district court formula­
tions of the standard that are more rigid than required, or jury instruc­
tions that blatantly misstate the law. 2 5 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should explicitly elimi­
nate non-class replacement as a requirement, and establish a multi­
factor approach to the prima facie stage of the. individual disparate 
treatment inquiry. Under this approach, non-class replacement would 
merely be one factor in a court's overall inquiry to decide whether the 
plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to "give rise to an inference 
of unlawful discrimination." 2 6 Part I demonstrates that the principles 
in O'Connor support eliminating non-class replacement as a require­
ment and adopting a multifactor approach to the prima facie case, and 
that this analysis is equally applicable in the Title VII arena. Part II 
suggests that a multifactor approach is compatible with the limited 
functions the prima facie stage serves within the burden-shifting 
framework. Part III asserts that a multifactor approach to the prima 
facie stage is also appropriate because of the overall goals of a burden­
shifting regime, which has been interpreted by courts as a flexible pro­
cedure. This Note concludes that a multifactor approach to the plain­
tiff's prima facie burden in Title VII cases, including the elimination of 
a non-class replacement requirement, most accurately reflects the 
overall structure and purposes of individual disparate treatment 
burden shifting, as well as current interpretations of the prima facie 
stage. 
I. SOLVING THE DILEMMA WITH AN EYE TO O'CONNOR V. 
CONSOLIDATED COIN CATERERS CORP. 
This Part asserts that eliminating a non-class replacement require­
ment and adopting a multifactor approach to the prima facie case are 
consistent with the requirements that the Supreme Court articulated 
in O'Connor regarding both logical connection to discrimination and 
protection of individual plaintiffs. Sectibn I.A contends that a multi­
factor approach honors both the logical connection test and the 
substantially younger requirement detailed by the Court in O'Connor. 
24. See, e.g., Horizan/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1195. 
25. See, e.g., Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2000) (deciding that 
"while the district court may have misstated the fourth element of the prima facie case" this 
mistake did not "necessarily compel reversal" because it was not ultimately central to the 
decision); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 351 (clearly eliminating a non-class replacement require­
ment, describing an instruction mentioning such a requirement as legally erroneous, and 
then deeming the mistake harmless error). 
26. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
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Section l.B argues that given the similarity in statutory language and 
purpose between the ADEA and Title VII, the multifactor approach 
to the prima facie stage suggested by the individual protection 
language in O'Connor is equally applicable to all discrimination statu­
tory claims, including Title VII actions. 
A. Bridging the Gap Between the Logical Connection Test and the 
Substantially Younger Requirement 
This Section shows how eliminating a non-class replacement 
requirement and adopting a multifactor approach to the prima facie 
stage synthesizes the logical connection test and the substantially 
younger requirement articulated by the Court in O'Connor. 
The O'Connor decision articulates two standards that lower courts 
should consider when making a prima facie assessment of a plaintiff's 
ADEA claim - the logical connection test and the substantially 
younger requirement.27 The best way for lower courts successfully to 
satisfy both principles is to eliminate a non-class replacement 
requirement and adopt a multifactor approach to the prima facie stage 
in all disparate treatment discrimination cases. 
The O'Connor decision requires "at least a logical connection 
between each element of the prima facie case" and the eventual find­
ing that the plaintiff has, or has not, raised a sufficient inference of 
discrimination to carry him to the next stage.28 In O'Connor, the Court 
found that requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that someone outside 
the protected class replaced him was not invariably logically connected 
to the determination of his case. The Court illustrated this conclusion 
by creating a hypothetical forty-year-old plaintiff, and reasoning that it 
would be absurd to determine that a thirty-nine-year-old plaintiff 
replacing a forty-year-old plaintiff would suggest a greater inference of 
discrimination than if a forty-year-old plaintiff replaced the fifty-six­
year-old O'Connor.29 
The Court took the argument one step further and declared that 
"the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the 
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case." 3 0  The O'Connor decision appeared to abolish any 
possibility of a non-class replacement requirement in future ADEA 
individual disparate treatment decisions. By creating the logical 
connection test, the Court eliminated non-class replacement as a 
dispositive requirement. 
27. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1996). 
28. Id. at 311. 
29. Id. at 312. 
30. Id. The rationale behind this exclusion was the Court's conclusion that the protected 
status of a replacement employee "lacks probative value." Id. 
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Despite the strength with which the logical connection test elimi­
nates non-class replacement as a prima facie requirement in age 
discrimination, subsequent language in the O'Connor decision 
suggests many circumstances in which considering the characteristics 
of the employee who replaced the plaintiff would be possible, or 
perhaps even required. In addition to the logical connection test, the 
O'Connor decision suggested that an inference of age discrimination 
could not "be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another 
worker insubstantially younger." 3 1  Although the Court did not frame 
this substantially younger factor as a reintroduction of a non-class 
replacement requirement, lower courts have seized on the "insubstan­
tially younger" language to defend their decisions to continue to 
include a non-class replacement requirement post-O 'Connor.3 2 
Courts have had difficulty analyzing prima facie cases in a manner 
that adheres to both the logical connection test and the substantially 
younger requirement. Courts that require plaintiffs to show that 
someone outside their protected class replaced them ignore the logical 
connection test. 3 3  Not every factual scenario lends itself to the conclu­
sion that there is a logical connection between a plaintiff's replace­
ment and the actual inference of discrimination. If the central purpose 
of the prima facie stage is for the plaintiff to establish an inference of 
discrimination, demonstrating replacement by someone outside his 
protected class is not the only plausible way of reaching this conclu­
sion. 3 4  Often, an employee can wholly demonstrate such an inference 
even without any reference to his replacement worker.3 5 Non-class 
replacement as a dispositive factor in Title VII situations is incompati­
ble with the logical connection test in O'Connor. 
At the other extreme, courts holding that the qualities of the 
replacement employee are irrelevant ignore the substantially younger 
31. Id. at 313. 
32 See, e.g., Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1997) (responding to a plain­
tiff's contention that O'Connor has "completely eradicated" a non-class replacement re­
quirement with the argument that O'Connor does in fact consider the "level of age dispar­
ity"). 
33. See, e.g., Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 103 F.3d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that a Title VII plaintiff relying solely on the McDonnell Douglas framework must always 
show that another similarly situated non-protected employee was treated more favorably in 
order to maintain a prima facie case). 
34. Jones v. W. Geophysical Co., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (declaring that "proof 
that the employer replaced the fired minority employee with a nonminority employee" is not 
the only way to raise a sufficient inference of discrimination). 
35. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An employee 
may be able to show that his race or another characteristic that the law places off limits 
tipped the scales against him, without regard to the demographic characteristics of his re­
placement."). 
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requirement.3 6  Under this view, the characteristics of a replacement 
employee should never be considered at the prima facie stage because 
the factor is not helpful to the prima facie inquiry. 3 7  Courts that refuse 
to consider non·class replacement at the prima facie stage ignore the 
practical problem that justifies the creation of a substantially younger 
requirement. While plaintiffs should not be required to show non·class 
replacement, neither should they be allowed to create a "prirna facie 
case on the basis of very thin evidence." 3 8  The prima facie inquiry must 
always remain focused on the plaintiff raising an actual inference of 
discrimination through the presentation of evidence - evidence that 
may or may not include a showing of non·class replacement. 
Adopting a multifactor approach at the prima facie stage satisfies 
both the logical connection test and the substantially younger 
requirement. Under this approach, the characteristics of an employee 
replacing the plaintiff could potentially be probative in evaluating the 
possibility of the inference of discrimination because the identity of 
the replacement employee often has great probative value in deter· 
mining whether a plaintiff has indeed raised the required inference of 
discrimination. 3 9  If no logical connection could be identified between 
36. If factually there is a logical connection between the plaintiffs replacement em­
ployee and the inference of illegal discrimination, deciding that replacement is irrelevant 
may also violate the logical connection test. 
37. Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (eliminating 
non-class replacement as a requirement because demonstrating replacement by someone 
outside the protected class does not eliminate a "common, lawful reasonD for the 
discharge"); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 23, at 482 (summarizing and endorsing the 
approach of circuits in which the identity of a plaintiffs replacement is irrelevant at the 
prima facie stage); Harris, supra note 4, at 297 (praising the O'Connor Court for eliminating 
the restriction because of "the lack of application to all situations of age discrimination"). 
38. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). 
39. Age difference is still probative under O'Connor, as demonstrated by the substan­
tially younger requirement. The identity of the replacement employee is not "outcome de­
terminative," but it is "material to the question of discriminatory intent." Nieto v. L&H 
Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit later reinforced the Nieto 
view in Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000). Jn that decision the 
court refused to accept the plaintiffs argument that Nieto had made the identity of the 
replacement employee irrelevant. Instead, the court repeated the Nieto "not determinative 
but still material" language and denied the plaintiff recovery. Id.; see also Walker v. St. 
Anthony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Giannotti v. Foundry Cafe, 
582 F. Supp. 503, 506 (D. Conn. 1984) (arguing that a worker's replacement identity "per­
tains to the weight of the evidence rather than to legal sufficiency)); Simens v. Reno, 960 F. 
Supp. 6, 9·10 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that while age difference, not class membership is pro­
bative in the ADEA context, class membership itself is still probative in Title VII situations). 
In the Title VII arena, class membership is still probative when it is used as a convenient 
shorthand for "class difference," "religious difference," or "sex difference. "  See Kendrick v. 
Penske Transp. Serv., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 n.8 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that while the 
plaintiff is not ordinarily obligated to show non-class replacement, neither is he precluded 
"from providing evidence of this nature as part of his prima facie case"). 
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this factor and an eventual inference of discrimination, however, the 
factor would no longer be considered.4 0 
B. The Individual Protection Bridge: Applying O'Connor Beyond 
the Boundaries of the AD EA 
This Section delineates the similarities between the ADEA and 
Title VII, and argues that the multifactor approach to the prima facie 
stage that is required by the individual protection language in 
O'Connor is equally relevant to Title VII claims of disparate treat­
ment in employment situations. 
The O'Connor Court was silent on the applicability of the decision 
to similar Title VII situations.4 1 Grafting analysis from one discrimina­
tion statute to another is neither difficult nor uncommon. Although 
the Court created the burden-shifting procedure in McDonnell 
Douglas in a Title VII case, courts have used this method of analysis 
for deciding discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and 
other statutes prohibiting discrimination.4 2 In addition, courts often 
regard the statutes as similar enough to warrant applying precedent 
from cases involving one statute to the current claims of another.4 3 
These transfers are possible and appropriate because of the simi­
larities in statutory language and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA. 
First, the statutory texts of Title VII and the ADEA are virtually 
identical. Although the two statutes list different characteristics 
against which discrimination is prohibited, the protections offered to 
employees are identical.4 4 
40. Thus, even if a plaintiff demonstrates replacement by someone outside her protected 
class, if the contextualizing facts still do not amount to an inference of discrimination, then 
the non-class replacement is not logically connected to the prima facie inquiry and the case 
may be dismissed at the prima facie stage. See, e.g., Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 
727 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff's evidence that she was replaced by a male 
was "simply insufficient" to carry her case). 
41. Clack-Freeman, supra note 23, at 482 ("The Court made no suggestion as to the 
applicability of the replacement requirement in the Title VII arena."). 
42. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying 
burden shifting framework to ADEA claims without discussion); O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311 
(same); see also Leffel v. Valley Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying bur­
den shifting framework to ADA claims); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 
1178 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 
43. Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 428 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (regard­
ing all discrimination statutes as "standing in pari passu of each other" and endorsing "the 
practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive in deci­
sions involving another" (quoting Serapi6n v. Martinez 119 F.3d 982, 984 (1st Cir. 1997))); 
see also Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666 {3d Cir. 1999) (accepting practice 
of using case law interchangeably). 
44. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (declaring sections of the two 
statutes to be almost in haec verba with each other); Harris, supra note 4, at 285 (demon­
strating how the legislative history of the ADEA suggests that Congress intended to provide 
the same protections with both the ADEA and Title VII, and comparing the statutes and 
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Additionally, the discrimination statutes share common purposes. 
Generally, the central purpose of the statutes is "to prohibit discrimi­
nation in employment against members of certain classes," 4 5  and 
"eliminate discrimination in the workplace." 4 6 More specifically, both 
the ADEA and Title VII emphasize the protection of individual plain­
tiffs, not entire plaintiff classes. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of personal protection in 
Title VII in Connecticut v. Teal.47 The Court found that "[t]he princi­
pal focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee, 
rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole." 4 8 
Refusing to focus on the "overall number of minority or female appli­
cants actually hired or promoted," the Court deemed the employer's 
nondiscriminatory "bottom line" an insufficient defense to allegations 
of individual discrimination.4 9  
The Court used this same individual protection language in 
O'Connor as a justification for eliminating non-class replacement as a 
prima facie requirement. According to the Court in O 'Connor, "[t]he 
fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another 
person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost 
out because of his age."50 
The personal protection focus of the ADEA identified in 
O'Connor supports, and perhaps mandates, eliminating a non-class 
replacement requirement and adopting a multifactor approach to 
Title VII claims. Similarly, this individual protection logic of 
O'Connor works with equal force to compel the elimination of a non­
class replacement requirement, and to endorse a multifactor approach 
to the prima facie stage in the Title VII arena. 51 
Making non-class replacement the dispositive factor in a plaintiff's 
case requires the plaintiff to do more than simply raise an inference of 
the discrimination she has suffered personally. Rather, a non-class 
replacement requirement forces employees to show that the employer 
has favored a non-protected employee over all employees with the 
protected characteristic. Thus, a non-class replacement requirement 
revealing that with the exception of the ADEA substituting age for the prohibited charac­
teristics listed in Title VII, the language of the two statutes is identical). 
45. Walton, 168 F.3d at 666 (quoting Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 
157 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
46. Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756. 
47. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
48. Teal, 457 U.S. at 453-54. 
49. Id. at 450. 
50. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). 
51. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (stressing that 
"laws against discrimination protect persons, not classes," and deciding that O'Connor's 
logic applies with "equal force" under Title VII). 
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increases the plaintiff's aggregate evidentiary burden, and negates the 
personal protection focus of discrimination statutes. 
Stripped to its barest essentials, an individual disparate treatment 
inquiry asks whether a particular plaintiff employee is the victim of 
intentional discrimination. 5 2  A court must evaluate whether the defen­
dant employer would have taken the "same action had the employee 
been of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin, etc.), and 
everything else had remained the same." 5 3  A mandatory non-class 
replacement requirement at the prima fade stage exceeds the scope of 
this inquiry. With such a requirement, plaintiffs are forced to raise an 
inference not only that their employer has discriminated against them, 
but also that their employer discriminates against every member of 
their protected class.5 4  On the other hand, completely ignoring 
replacement identity does not satisfy the aim of focusing on individual 
discrimination. In order to allow a plaintiff to sustain a case based only 
on personal discrimination, courts must eliminate non-class replace­
ment as a requirement and adopt a multifactor approach to the prima 
fade stage. 
A multifactor approach protects the individual because employ­
ment discrimination suits are by their nature fact intensive. Given the 
sheer quantity of facts that a court must consider in making an 
employment discrimination judgment, there are an endless number of 
factors that could be relevant in proving a prima facie case of 
discrimination.5 5 Some of these factors might include a formal policy 
elucidating a pattern of discrimination, or informal comments and 
actions of authority figures reflecting discriminatory animus. Struc­
tural factors, like the redistribution of a discharged employee's duties, 
or behavioral factors, like a preferential treatment given w non­
protected employees, could also be relevant. Additionally, factfinders 
52. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 {2000) (generalizing 
that this is the ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim 
of disparate treatment). 
53. Carson, 82 F.3d at 158. 
54. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1138 n.8 {10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a non-class 
replacement requirement in part because plaintiffs would "effectively be required" to 
demonstrate discrimination against "every other employee or potential employee who 
shares her protected attribute"). Another potential standard raised by employers takes non­
class replacement to the extreme. In this framework, a plaintiff is required to prove he is 
replaced not only by someone outside his protected class, but outside any protected class. 
See Chock v. Northwest Airlines, 113 F.3d 861, 863 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the 
absurdity of a standard under which plaintiffs must show "replacement by a person outside 
any protected class for a prima facie case"). 
55. The McDonnell Douglas Court recognized the need for flexibility resulting from the 
wide variety of factors by cautioning that the prima facie framework articulated for that case 
was not automatically applicable to every fact scenario. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); see also Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 
81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the "fourth element set forth in McDonnell Douglas is 
a flexible one that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios"). 
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might gain insight by examining the events preceding the discrimina­
tory action. A pattern of unequal discipline prior to a dismissal, or 
actions taken after the discriminatory occurrence could substantiate 
the inference.5 6 
With so many potential factors for a court to consider, isolating 
one factor as necessary to establish a prima facie case is counter 
productive because it fails to further the goal of individual protection. 
Replacement by someone outside a plaintiff's protected class is often 
helpful to create an inference of discrimination, but it is not always 
necessary. 5 7  Individual plaintiffs are not protected under an inflexible 
rule requiring proof of one or more arbitrary specific factors because 
meritorious claims missing that particular factor are dismissed.5 8 On 
the other hand, a multifactor approach embraces the individual fact 
intensive nature of individual disparate treatment claims. Plaintiffs are 
required only to prove those factors that contribute to their personal 
discrimination suit, not a generalized prototype-discrimination situa­
tion. These similarities in text and purpose instruct that a multifactor 
approach is equally applicable to both the ADEA, as understood by 
the Court in O'Connor, and Title VII. 
A multifactor approach to the prima facie stage of any discrimina­
tion claim raises some concerns. For example, without clearly deline­
ated standards from the Supreme Court, circuit courts tend to fill in 
the gaps with their own, often conflicting, interpretations of the prima 
facie requirements.5 9 In order to protect all plaintiffs and defendants 
equally, even a flexible multifactor approach must culminate in some 
consistent overarching standard. (j() The factors of a prima facie case 
56. This list is compiled from a variety of sources both listing factors that could poten­
tially contribute to an inference of discrimination and describing individual factors that 
played a key role in particular cases. See, e.g, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 486, 494 
(7th Cir. 2000); Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 103 F.3d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1997); Chertkova, 
92 F.3d at 91; Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994); Shah v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 816 F.2d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1987); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 
F.2d 1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984). 
57. See, e.g., Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (arguing that replacement 
by an employee from within the class "may weaken, but certainly does not eliminate, the 
inference of discrimination"). 
58. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an inflexible rule 
as untenable). One commentator has dubbed the inevitable dismissal of meritorious claims 
that would result from a per se non-class replacement requirement a "parade of horribles." 
See Clack-Freeman, supra note 23, at 488; see also Beth M. Weber, The Effect of O'Connor 
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. on the Requirements for Establishing a Prima Facie 
Case Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 647, 669 (1998) 
(urging a unified approach because "[wJithout a precise standard, each circuit will be able to 
establish its own guidelines"). 
59. Weber, supra note 58, at 669 (finding that a bright-line rule is more appropriate in 
Title VII cases where the characteristics are not on a continuum). 
60. While the more general formulation of a standard, rather than a rule, might upset 
the "preset balance between permissible and impermissible conduct," ultimately a unified 
approach (even if this approach is comprised of several factors) is superior to arbitrary rules 
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may "vary with the circumstances of the alleged discrimination," 6 1  but 
the ultimate prima facie inquiry remains unchanged - the plaintiff 
must always raise an inference of discrimination. This approach 
abundantly protects individual plaintiffs - plaintiffs are only required 
to present the evidence relevant to their particular case, yet are still 
guided by an unwavering duty to raise an inference of discrimination. 
Furthermore, some scholars and courts argue that, even if a 
multifactor approach is dictated in ADEA situations by O'Connor, 
the decision is patently inapplicable to Title VII not because of 
dissimilarities in statutory language or purpose, but because of the 
dissimilarity of the characteristics the statutes shield from discrimina­
tion. Thus, according to this viewpoint, O'Connor is inapplicable in 
the Title VII arena because Title VII protected characteristics do not 
lend themselves to analysis on a continuum like the ADEA protected 
class of all individuals over forty years old. 6 2  Rather, Title VII protects 
binary characteristics that cannot be analyzed with a sliding-scale 
approach.6 3  This perspective concludes that because there can be no 
varying levels of race, gender, or religion disparity between 
employees, a bright-line rule requiring non-class replacement is 
appropriate for the Title VII arena. 6 4  
This viewpoint overlooks the possibility for variations in the 
manifestations of these otherwise immutable characteristics between 
different employees within a single gender, religion, or race. For 
example, manifestations of race can be seen as a continuum with dark­
skinned African Americans being discriminated against in favor of 
light-skinned African Americans. 6 5  In the gender context, an employer 
might preference a woman who is more traditional in her under­
standing of gender roles over a woman who appears to violate norms 
because of the potential for genuine substantive consistency in judicial decision. Pierre J. 
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985). 
61. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (quoting Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 
673, 676 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
62. Congress limited the protected class covered by the ADEA to employees over forty 
years old. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). 
63. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 23, at 490 (concluding that because Title VII charac­
teristics are immutable, the Court will not have the luxury of using a "sliding scale" test 
when deciding such a case); Harris, supra note 4, at 300 (saying that Title VII protects char­
acteristics which are immutable and binary). Also note that under this theory, claims of dis­
parate treatment discrimination based on disability are included within the scope of 
O'Connor because disability, like age, is not uniform. See, e.g. , Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. 
Corp. , 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 n.11 (claiming that "unlike traits such as gender and race which are 
uniform among members of the protected class, disabilities are diverse"). 
64. See, e.g., Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C. 1997) ("[T]here can be no issue 
of the level of sex disparity. You are either a woman or you are not."). 
65. See Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997) (Lewis, J., 
dissenting) (discussing replacement of dark-skinned blacks with light-skinned blacks in order 
to make white co-workers and customers more comfortable). 
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of gender behavior.6 6 In contrast, an employer might favor a woman 
who fits into an "old boys club" over a woman who defied this 
infrastructure.6 7 In terms of religion, an employer could favor an em­
ployee who is less observant of his faith over one who requires more 
accommodations because of religious belief.6 8 Finally, discrimination 
could be based on a combination of protected attributes. 6 9  In all of 
these situations, an employee could be replaced by someone from 
within her protected class, yet still be the victim of impermissible Title 
VII discrimination. Thus, because the manifestations of Title VII 
characteristics are not static between employees, but rather exist on 
continuums similar to age, it is incongruous to deny Title VII plaintiffs 
the use of the individual protections offered to ADEA plaintiffs under 
O 'Connor. 
II. SOLVING THE DILEMMA WITH AN EYE TO PRIMA F ACIE 
PURPOSES 
The prima facie stage of the burden-shifting inquiry has specific 
and limited purposes. Given these narrow functions, plaintiffs must 
satisfy only a low evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage. This 
Part argues that a multifactor approach is the best way to effectuate 
this low evidentiary burden, and also helps to further the remaining 
prima facie goals. 
Eliminating a non-class replacement requirement and adopting a 
multifactor approach to the plaintiff's initial Title VII burden is a 
viable option because the Supreme Court has continually narrowed 
the purposes and functions of the prima facie stage. Beginning with 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,70 the Court has 
repeatedly stressed that a plaintiff's satisfaction of the prima facie 
stage only shifts the burden of production, not the burden of persua­
sion, to the defendant. 7 1  By consistently stating that the prima facie 
66. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging the possibility of replacing one woman with another 
who "more closely resembles a conception of the so-called feminine ideal"). 
67. See, e.g., Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting that some females may be preferred in an "old boys network" because they are more 
like "one of the boys" than other females). 
68. See, e.g. , Klein v. Derwinksi, 869 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1994) (plaintiff is dismissed 
after requesting time off for a religious holiday, but is denied relief because she is replaced 
by someone of her same religion). 
69. See Goosby, 228 F.3d at 321 (declaring that proof that a white female replaced a 
black female does not defeat a claim of race/gender discrimination). 
70. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
71. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (holding that only the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant after the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination). 
The distinction between shifting the burden of production and shifting the burden of persua­
sion was later considered by the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502 (1993) (refusing to compel judgment when the plaintiff has only produced prima 
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stage only shifts the burden of production to the defendant, courts 
have created a structure in which eliminating a non-class replacement 
requirement and adopting a multifactor approach would not reduce 
the plaintiff's initial burdens and thus give the plaintiff an unfair 
advantage. 7 2  
If satisfying the prima facie stage of the inquiry relieved a plaintiff 
from the responsibility of persuasion, then eliminating a non-class 
replacement requirement and adopting a multifactor approach to the 
prima facie stage would be fundamentally unfair. A plaintiff could 
shirk the ultimate burden of proof merely by demonstrating a loose 
collection of insufficient facts. Using a multifactor approach at the 
prima facie stage makes sense only because the burden of persuasion 
never shifts to the defendant. 
Given that the prima facie stage only serves to shift the burden of 
production to the defendant, the evidentiary requirement at the prima 
facie stage can be quite low.7 3 A plaintiff may use a variety of evidence 
to meet her minimal evidentiary burden. 
The quantity of evidence a plaintiff must put forth in order to 
survive the prima facie analysis under McDonnell Douglas is modest. 7 4  
A plaintiff's prima facie evidence "need not be overwhelming, or even 
destined to ultimately prevail" on the discrimination claim.7 5 
facie evidence and rebutted pretextual reasons), and a gain in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (refusing to preclude j udgment when the plaintiff has 
only produced prima facie evidence and rebutted pretextual reasons). While the Court in 
Hicks a nd Reeves implicitly helped to define the purposes of the prima facie stage by clari­
fying the exact nature of the burdens that shift a s  a result of a plaintiff creating a prima facie 
case, both Courts merely glossed over the prima facie sta ge itself in their a nalysis. See 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (acknowledging that it is "undisputed" that the plaintiff satisfied the 
prima facie stage in part because "respondent successively hired three persons in their thir­
ties to fill petitioner's position"); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (merely mentioning that "minimal 
requirements of such a prima facie case" had been established by proving, among other ele­
ments, "(4) that the position remained open a nd was ultimately filled by a white man"). Al­
t hough the Hicks Court included non-class replacement on the list of factors establishing the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, J ustice Souter explicitly pointed out in his dissent that this mere 
mention did not signify a decision that non-class repla cement wa s a required prima facie fac­
t or. See id. at 527 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the "Court has not directly 
addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace a 
Title VII plaintiff are material, and that issue is not before us today"). 
72 But see Mark A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks and the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 ST. JOHN'SJ .  LEGAL 
COMMENT. 67, 70 (1993) (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas framework is an "audacious 
a nd arbitrary" unauthorized a ct of judicial legislation violating separation of powers princi­
ples, and criticizing the Court for construing the prima facie stage a s  a weak presumption 
that alters the substantive balance of power in disparate treatment ca ses). 
73. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 4, at 289 (concluding that in part the "reason for this 
relatively low litigation hurdle is because of the important role that the prima facie case 
serves"). 
74. See, e.g. , Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing 
the plaintiff's evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage as "rather modest"). 
75. Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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Comparatively, the evidentiary·burden of a McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie case is even lower than that which is required at other prima 
facie stages of non-McDonnell Douglas claims. 7 6  One classic Supreme 
Court articulation of the plaintiff's prima facie burden under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is simply that the burden is "not 
onerous."77 To maintain a prima facie case, the plaintiff simply must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was "rejected under 
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimina­
tion." 7 8  
Also in keeping with the limited purposes of the prima facie stage, 
requirements about the types of evidence a plaintiff may use to meet 
his prima facie burden are quite liberal. Plaintiffs have the "full 
panopoly of circumstantial evidence" at their disposal in meeting their 
initial prima facie burden of production. 7 9  This collection includes 
statistical evidence of systematic disparate treatment, comparative 
personal evidence of individual disparate treatment, related comments 
by people in positions of authority, or evidence of replacement at 
work by a person not in the employee's protected class.8 0 Plaintiffs 
may even meet their evidentiary burdens with a combination of direct 
and circumstantial evidence that, while not individually sufficient, 
together create an inference of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the 
prima facie burden.81 This low evidentiary burden compels - and is 
essentially synonymous with - a multifactor approach. 
76. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (comparing the 
requirements of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas to the requirements of a prima 
facie case "in the absence of a special policy-based rule similar to that promulgated by 
McDonnell Douglas"). 
77. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
78. Id. Furthermore, the inference is often a "relatively weak" one, corresponding to the 
"small amount of proof necessary to create it." EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 
220 F.3d 1 184, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). But see Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie 
case is "minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the 
evidence"). 
79. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 581 {1st Cir. 1 999). 
80. See id. (enumerating a nonexhaustive list of types of circumstantial evidence). 
81. Burden shifting was originally created in part to compensate plaintiffs for the reality 
that employers rarely leave an incriminating trail of direct evidence in the wake of discrimi­
nation. Hasham v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1 035, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) 
("Because employers are usually careful not to offer smoking gun remarks indicating inten­
tional discrimination, the Supreme Court established the burden shifting approach as a 
means of evaluating indirect evidence of discrimination. "). Thus, plaintiffs are not required 
to produce direct evidence of discrimination when using the McDonnell Douglas scheme 
because to do so would blatantly subvert the core purpose of burden shifting. See Marzano v. 
Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 507 {3rd Cir. 1996) (chastising that "our legal scheme 
against discrimination would be little more than a toothless tiger if the courts were to re­
quire . . .  direct evidence of discrimination"). 
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A multifactor approach also supports the established evidentiary 
burden of the prima facie case because the standard is not limitless. In 
order to function efficiently, the prima facie case must have some 
evidentiary burden. Setting the evidentiary bar so low that any plain­
tiff could automatically meet the standard would strain judicial 
resources by "open[ing} the judicial floodgates" to the claims of every 
plaintiff who misinterprets an ordinary business decision as motivated 
by discriminatory animus.8 2 The consequences of such an unreasonably 
low standard would be far-reaching. Defendants targeted in frivolous 
discrimination claims could suffer great losses in resources or reputa­
tion. 83 Furthermore, without a minimum evidentiary requirement, 
courts would routinely be forced to function as arbitral boards ruling 
on the soundness of ordinary business decisions.8 4 
This judicial function would overstep the scope of discrimination 
statutes. 8 5  These statutes do not guarantee employment or assess 
business decisions. 8 6  Their central purpose is simply to eliminate 
invidious discriminatory barriers in the workplace.8 7 Thus, while the 
strength of a particular plaintiff's prima facie inference of discrimina­
tion may vary according to the particular evidence he adduces,8 8 under 
a multifactor approach the evidentiary bar is never set so low so as to 
negate the necessity of raising an inference of discrimination. 8 9  
82 See Marzano, 91 F.3d at 509 (arguing that the test articulated in the decision does 
not reach this low level). 
83. See Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 9 n.4 (D.D.C. 1 997) (speculating on the conse­
quences of allowing a plaintiff to "shoot into a barrel of fish" and maintain a prima facie case 
without even "something reasonable on which to rest a claim"). 
84. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 1 57, 1 59 (7th Cir. 1 996) (refusing to 
allow courts to become "arbitral boards, ruling on the strength of ' cause' for discharge" and 
noting that the real question in a discrimination case is "not whether the employer made the 
best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is race"). 
85. For example, the clearly articulated purpose of Title VII is to "assure equality of 
employment opportunity and to eliminate . . . discriminatory practices and devices . . . .  " 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
86. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1 220, 1 232 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing that "Title VII does not make unexplained differences in treatment per se ille­
gal nor does it make inconsistent or irrational employment practices illegal" (quoting EEOC 
v. Fasher Co., 986 F.2d 1 31 2, 1 31 9  {1 992) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Smith v. 
F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 1 996) ("Title VII is neither a shield against 
( the] broad spectrum of employer actions nor a statutory guaranty of full employment, come 
what may." ). 
87. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 . 
88. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2246 (1995) (noting that the "actual strength of the inferences that can 
be drawn from the prima facie case vary depending on the strength of the evidence that sup­
ports it"). 
89. Some courts are wary that an overly flexible approach will "give complete weight­
lessness to an already light plaintiffs burden." Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C. 
1 997). This view fails to appreciate that survival at even a flexible prima facie stage does not 
preclude the possibility of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Roach v. 
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While the functions of the · prima facie case are obviously limited 
by the fact that satisfaction of the prima facie stage only shifts the 
burden of production to the defendant, within this narrow avenue the 
first stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis still serves many useful 
purposes. First, the prima facie stage screens out invalid or incomplete 
claims.90 This initial analysis eliminates "the most common nondis­
criminatory reasons" for the employer's action.9 1 If a plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate even a prima facie case, then the case is dismissed 
without wasting judicial resources to complete perfunctorily the 
McDonnell Douglas process.9 2 
A multifactor approach is compatible with the screening purpose 
of the prima facie stage because the prima facie stage is only the first 
and broadest filter for untenable claims of disparate treatment. The 
screening benefit is obtained so long as the prima facie stage continues 
to identify cases in which "discrimination might conceivably have been 
operating." 9 3  Some scholars worry that adding more flexibility to the 
prima facie stage could increasingly waste judicial resources because 
courts would be forced to look at the circumstances of each case and 
continually weigh the merits of the individual claim. 9 4  This view 
presumes that the purpose of the prima facie stage is to eliminate indi­
vidual analysis by sorting claims into generalized categories. Quite the 
Vallen Safety Supply Co., No. 00-2709, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 6200 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 2001) 
(granting summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff was unable to produce a 
link between her employer's actions and discrimination sufficient to give rise to the required 
level of inference); Hornsby v. Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting summary 
judgment for the defendant because her wholly subjective beliefs did not give rise to the re­
quired level of inference). Furthermore, while eliminating non-class replacement as a re­
quirement, and adopting a flexible approach may result in more plaintiffs surviving the 
prima facie stage or summary judgment, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
more frivolous claims are avoiding elimination at the initial stage of burden shifting. One 
court has even suggested that more cases go to trial simply because that is "the nature of the 
evidentiary beast" as applied to disparate treatment situations. See Marzano v. Computer 
Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3rd Cir. 1996). In other words, "summary judgment is in fact 
rarely appropriate in this type of case" because there are genuine issues of material fact 
which must be sorted out by a full adjudication before a factfinder. See id. 
90. See, e.g., Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999} (noting 
that one of the purposes of the prima facie case is to " 'screen out' " cases where " 'the plain­
tiff fails to distinguish his or her case from the ordinary, legitimate kind of adverse personnel 
decision' " (quoting Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1985))). 
91. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
92. See, e.g., Ang v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 1991} ("When a 
court is convinced that a plaintiff completely failed to allege circumstances from which dis­
crimination can be inferred, the court need not examine all elements of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis."). 
93. Malamud, supra note 88, at 2244. 
94. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 58, at 667-68 (postulating that a lower prima facie stan­
dard would require courts to look at the circumstances of each case, and would result in "an 
increase in the number of claims filed" and "an increase in the amount of time it would take 
courts to make decisions in each case because of the weighing process they would be re­
quired to perform"). 
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contrary, while courts generalize about minimum nondiscriminatory 
reasons a plaintiff can disprove and still proceed, plaintiffs do not 
survive the prima facie stage unless they adduce particularized evi­
dence that eliminates these nondiscriminatory reasons and raises an 
inference of discrimination.95 Rather than impeding the screening 
function, a multifactor approach at the prima facie stage actually 
fosters accurate elimination of nonviable claims. 
Second, eliminating a non-class replacement requirement and 
using a multifactor approach also assists in another central goal of the 
prima facie stage and burden shifting in general - the practical func­
tion of "fine-tuning" the facts and evidence.96 As burden shifting pro­
ceeds, "an initially vague allegation of discrimination is increasingly 
sharpened and focused, until the ultimate inquiry is one that is ame­
nable to judicial resolution." 9 7  
This fine-tuning function is fulfilled only if each stage of burden 
shifting continues to propel the analysis forward. Far from being an 
ultimate resolution of the discrimination issue, a basic role of the 
prima facie stage within this structure is merely to "allow the case to 
reach the next stage of analysis." 9 8  A key purpose of the prima facie 
stage is simply to "force [a] defendant to proceed with its case," and 
offer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 9 9  This moves the 
analysis forward because often the employer has better access to 
information regarding the employer's true motivations than the 
employee.100 
An approach to the prima facie stage that includes a mandatory 
non-class replacement requirement stifles this inquiry because a suit 
could be dismissed where a plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a 
pre-determined set of prescribed requirements. In contrast, a multi­
factor approach assists the fine-tuning function because it permits 
plaintiffs to survive the prima facie stage based only on the particular 
95. Compare Int') Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977 ) 
(holding that elimination of the two most common legitimate reasons for the employment 
decision is "sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was 
a discriminatory one"), with Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497,  508 (3rd Cir. 
1996) (describing the plaintiffs prima facie burden as ensuring she has "enough evidence to 
construct the chain of inferences" and that her "factual scenario is compatible with discrimi­
natory intent - i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action"). 
96. See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that one of the over­
arching purposes of a trifurcated inquiry is to inject "a fine-tuning element into the presenta­
tion of proof in Title VII cases"). 
97. Id. 
98. Harris, supra note 4, at 289. 
99. Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. Avery 
Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861-62 (6th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (internal quota­
tion marks omitted)). 
100. See id. at 665 (noting "the disparity in access to information between employee and 
employer" (quoting Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d. 1177, 1192 (11th Cir. 1998))). 
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facts relevant to their individual situations, and allows the inquiry to 
progress to the critical stage of defendant revelation. 
Ill. SOLVING THE DILEMMA WITH AN EYE TO BURDEN-SHIFTING 
GOALS 
This Part argues that a multifactor approach to the prima facie case 
is in harmony with courts' overall commitment to interpret the 
McDonnell Douglas framework as a flexible procedural tool intended 
to facilitate, rather than impede, the ultimate inquiries in discrimina­
tion suits. 
From its inception, the burden-shifting procedure outlined by the 
Court in McDonnell Douglas was not intended to be a rigid proce­
dural straight jacket.JO' In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,102 the 
Court emphasized that the burden-shifting procedure of McDonnell 
Douglas "was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."1 0 3  
Instead of treating the burden-shifting procedure as a strict linear pro­
gression, a multifactor approach cultivates interdependence between 
all stages of the inquiry.104 This more flexible application of the 
burden-shifting procedure also means using the procedure to different 
degrees as is dictated by the particular circumstances.1 0 5  
This .flexibility is also required because, although burden shifting 
potentially has implicit substantive consequences,106 fundamentally it is 
a procedural device meant to help, not hinder, the ultimate disparate 
101. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (noting that the 
burden shifting procedure is being laid out in this instance in order to resolve the "notable 
lack of harmony" amongst lower court opinions by placing the procedure within the "broad, 
overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer" in "fair and racially neu­
tral employment and personnel decisions"). 
102. 438 U .S. 567 (1978). 
103. Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U .S. at 577. 
104. See, e.g., Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997 n.12 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that "the 
efficacy of employment discrimination law depends upon the interdependence of the prima 
facie case, the employer's rebuttal and proof of pretext"); see also Smith v. F.W. Morse & 
Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the "seeming neatness of [the burden shift­
ing] dichotomy is illusory . . .  for evidence rarely comes in tidy, geometrically precise pack­
ages"). 
105. See, e.g ., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) (limiting 
the use of burden shifting, and proceeding directly to the ultimate question because "strict 
application of the burden shifting framework is not particularly helpful to our analysis"). 
106. Burden shifting might substantively assist plaintiffs because the plaintiffs prima 
facie burden, as defined in McDonnell Douglas, is lower than that which is normally re­
quired to sustain a prima facie case in non-employment litigation. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 
114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing the requirements of a prima facie case "in the 
absence of a special policy-based rule similar to that promulgated by McDonnell Douglas"); 
Daniel W. Zappo, Note, A Causal Nexus Approach to the Title Vil Disparate Treatment 
Claims, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1082-83 (1998) (noting that the framework has several 
substantive purposes including "searching for various kinds of disparate treatment," and 
assisting "plaintiffs by fleshing out the facts"). 
March 2003) The Replacement Dilemma 1359 
treatment inquiry.1 0 7  Essentially, the p1iimary purpose of burden shift­
ing is to facilitate a speedy and just resolution of the final question of 
intentional discrimination.1 0 8  All the elements of burden shifting 
should facilitate, not stifle, the substantive resolution of an employ­
ment discrimination matter. 1 0 9  
When courts implement burden shifting as an inflexible process, 
they allow form to trump substance.1 1 0  Only by using the stages of 
burden shifting as flexible procedural tools focused on facilitating the 
central inquiry can courts achieve the central purposes of the process. 
One of the original purposes of burden shifting was to allow plain­
tiffs to attempt to prove their case by inference when they were unable 
to offer direct evidence of discrimination.1 1 1  This alternative avenue of 
proof is especially critical in employment discrimination cases because 
employers are "usually careful not to offer smoking gun remarks indi­
cating intentional discrimination." 1 1 2  Given that modem discrimina­
tion is potentially even more difficult to uncover than the more 
obvious discrimination prevalent at the time burden shifting was origi­
nally created, there is a continuing need for an effective procedure for 
adjudicating these claims. 113 A multifactor approach to burden shifting, 
carefully and rigorously applied by courts, would fulfill this need. 
In addition to requiring thoughtful interplay between stages of the 
McDonnell Douglas process, the Supreme Court has remained firmly 
committed to flexibility within individual stages, specifically the prima 
facie stage. Even in McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court emphasized 
that given the factual nature of discrimination cases, the prima facie 
107. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 995 (noting that burden shifting is meant to be a procedural tool 
that focuses an "initially vague allegation of discrimination" into an "ultimate inquiry . . . 
that is amenable to judicial resolution"). 
108. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U .S. 248, 253 (1981) (explaining 
that "[t]he McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring 
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question" of discrimina­
tion). 
109. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U .S. 711, 716 (1983) 
(noting that the allocation of evidentiary burdens should not make the "inquiry even more 
difficult"); Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1358 (Calabresi, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing 
that "verbal confusions" should not keep courts from the purposes that Title VII seeks to 
achieve). 
110. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421-22 (1st Cir. 1996) (declining to 
follow strict burden shifting guidelines because a "slavish insistence upon process for its own 
sake serves only to exalt the trappings of justice over its substance"). 
111. See, e.g., Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1103-04 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(clarifying that the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination is only required when 
cases are being proven by indirect evidence, not when discriminatory intent is demonstrated 
with direct evidence). 
112. Hasham v. California Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). 
113. See Smith, 76 F.3d at 430 (Bownes, J., concurring) (praising burden shifting as a 
necessary process for weeding out di scrimi nation that is "as subtle as it is invidious"); 
Lawton, supra note 1. 
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formulation would vary in accordance with the particular facts of a 
given situation. 114 The Court clarified this view shortly thereafter in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.1 15  Reiterating 
that McDonnell Douglas was not an "inflexible formulation," the 
Court stressed that the real value of the articulation of the prima facie 
stage in McDonnell Douglas was not the list of specific prima facie 
evidentiary requirements, but rather the "general principle" behind 
the prima facie stage.116 In subsequent decisions, the Court reinforced 
the notion that the McDonnell Douglas formulation of the prima facie 
stage was simply "an appropriate model for a prima facie case." 117 It 
was one method of demonstrating a prima facie claim, but was never 
intended as an inflexible rule.1 8 
Recognizing that proof of discrimination often "does not fit into a 
set of pigeonholes," 119 lower courts have attempted to heed the 
Supreme Court's command to embrace flexibility at the prima facie 
stage of burden shifting. One circuit has been willing to modify its 
prima facie standard "(i]n certain cases involving discrimination falling 
outside the more traditional categories of firing and hiring . . . . " 120 
Another circuit adapts the requirements "in special cases to reflect 
more fairly and accurately the underlying reality of the workplace." 121 
For example, although plaintiffs must ordinarily prove that their posi­
tion remained open after they are discharged or rejected, in "reduc­
tion in force" cases plaintiffs must prove only that similarly situated 
employees who were not members of their protected class were 
treated more favorably.122 While both of these circuits appear to 
embrace a commitment to viewing the prima facie stage as a realistic 
presentation of particular evidence, they fall short of the Supreme 
114. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (explaining that 
"the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not n ecessarily 
applicable in every respect to differin g factual situations"). 
115. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The factual pattern of this case was not individual disparate 
treatment, but rather group disparate treatment (pattern and practice of discrimination). 
Nonetheless, the Court's general comments about McDonnell Douglas are applicable to in­
dividual disparate treatment situations. 
116. lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S: at 358. 
117. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981). 
118. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978). 
119. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996). 
120. Amro v. Boein g Co., 232 F.3d 790, 797 n .3  (10th Cir. 2000). 
121. Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 2000). 
122 Id. at 494. " 'Reduction in force' " ("RJF" )  is a "term of art in employment law 
meaning the positions were eliminated and the employees not replaced." Id. at 489. 
Although the court discusses the RIF standard, the court ultimately determined that this 
particular case was not suitable for the revised RIF prima facie criteria because the employer 
had potentially manipulated the use of the term RIF as a pretense for impermissible 
discrimination. Id. at 494. 
March 2003] The Replacement Dilemma 1361 
Court commitment to flexibility because they adopt these alternate 
approaches only in extraordinary cases. 
A multifactor approach includes both a realistic view of the inter­
play between burden-shifting stages, and flexibility at each individual 
stage - most notably the prima facie step. Only with an attentive eye 
to both of these aspects can courts heed the Supreme Court's com­
mand for flexibility in burden shifting. 
CONCLUSION 
Thirty years ago the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a 
discrimination case "[i]n order to clarify the standards governing the 
disposition of an action challenging employment discrimination."1 2 3  
The result was the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting procedure, a 
framework that has survived countless clarifications and challenges. 
This Note argues that once again the Supreme Court must step 
forward and clarify an aspect of this enduring procedure. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court should eliminate non-class replacement as a prima 
facie requirement in all individual disparate treatment cases, and 
explicitly adopt a multifactor approach to a plaintiff's prima facie bur­
den at the initial stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting pro­
cedure. 
First, a multifactor approach is an appropriate model for Title VII 
cases because it coherently combines the central principles articulated 
by the Court in O'Connor, principles which are justifiably applicable 
to the Title VII arena. Additionally, eliminating non-class replacement 
as a requirement comports with the minimal evidentiary burden 
accompanying the narrow purposes of the prima facie stage because it 
does not functionally require plaintiffs to adduce more evidence than 
otherwise required. Finally, a multifactor approach to the prima fade 
stage is consistent with the overarching theme of flexibility in the 
structure of burden shifting, and within the individual stages of burden 
shifting. 
Inherently well-suited to consistent and coherent promulgation 
because of its simplicity, the Supreme Court's endorsement of a multi­
factor approach would stabilize the disharmony running rampant 
throughout the circuits at the prima fade stage. This result is legally 
compelled, structurally sound, and perhaps, most importantly, would 
inject a dose of common sense into the procedurally cumbersome 
employment discrimination arena.1 2 4  
123. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). 
124. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1997) (stressing that 
"(a] little common sense is not amiss in a discrimination case" ). 
